

Civil Procedure
Winter Term 2023

LECTURE NOTES NO. 5

IV. ESTOPPEL AND RES JUDICATA

Overview

The word *estoppel* is derived from an old and obsolete French word, *estouppail* (a stopper, itself derived from the Latin *stuppa* referring to a plug) and is now only used as a legal term.

An estoppel is a general legal principle that prevents a party from contesting a fact or issue that has already been settled as between that person and another. There is no 'unified theory' of estoppel save for abstract legal concepts like equity or conscience. Rather, every estoppel rule is rationalized in its context and is capable of precise articulation and application as a rule of law in that same context.

For example, ***estoppel by convention*** operates where the parties have agreed that certain facts are deemed to be true and to form the basis of the transaction into which they are about to enter. If they have acted upon the agreed assumption, then, as regards that transaction, each is estopped against the other from questioning the truth of the statement of facts so assumed if it would be unjust to allow one to go back on it. An ***estoppel by representation*** arises where a positive representation made by the party whom it is sought to bind, with the intention that it shall be acted on by the party with whom he or she is dealing, the latter having so acted upon it as to make it inequitable that the party making the representation should be permitted to dispute its truth, or do anything inconsistent with it. The leading case on these two forms of estoppel is *Ryan v. Moore*, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 53.

Another example is ***proprietary estoppel***. This doctrine requires proof of three elements: (i) an owner of the land induces, encourages or allows the claimant to believe that he has or will enjoy some right or benefit over the property; (ii) in reliance upon his belief, the plaintiff acts to his detriment to the knowledge of the owner; and (iii) the owner then seeks to take unconscionable advantage of the plaintiff by denying him the right or benefit which he expected to receive. There is a close connection between this form of estoppel and unjust enrichment; see *Schwark v. Cutting*, 2010 ONCA 61 (Ont. C.A.).

***Cause of action estoppel* and *issue estoppel* are two branches of *res judicata* (a matter adjudicated).** A related doctrine is the prevention of '**collateral attacks**' on a judicial Order or finding. Each is different but all relate to the goal of preventing an abuse of the Court's process by allowing the parties to re-litigate a particular

issue or cause of action. The broad rationale for these rules is the interest in maintaining the finality of decisions.

- **The doctrine of *cause of action estoppel*** is based on the premise that, where the legal rights or liabilities of the parties have been determined in a prior action, they should not be re-litigated. Cause of action estoppel applies not only to points on which the court has pronounced but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of the litigation; *Reddy v. Oshawa Flying Club* (1992), 11 C.P.C. 154 at 158 (Ont. Gen. Div.).
- **The doctrine of *issue estoppel*** precludes a party from re-litigating a legal or factual issue that has been conclusively resolved in a prior proceeding. The doctrine rests on the finality principle, which is a compelling consideration that ordinarily limits a litigant 'to one bite at the cherry'; *Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc.*, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 460 at paras. 18-19.

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***Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc.* 2001
SCC 44 (S.C.C.)**

When is a civil action precluded on the basis of issue estoppel where an administrative decision dealt with the same issues?

Here an employee sued for wrongful dismissal and \$300,000 in commission owed to her notwithstanding the decision of an 'employment standards officer' (as per the *Employment Standards Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.14) that she was not entitled to the money claimed. The employee started the process by which that decision was made and made some errors in pursuing the grievance, but the process itself was unfair and the decision not made in a judicial manner.

Binnie J.:

23 In this appeal the parties have not argued "cause of action" estoppel, apparently taking the view that the statutory framework of the ESA claim sufficiently distinguishes it from the common law framework of the court case. I therefore say no more about it. They have, however, joined issue on the application of issue estoppel and the relevance of the rule against collateral attack.

24 Issue estoppel was more particularly defined by Middleton J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *McIntosh v. Parent*, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 420 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 422:

When a question is litigated, the judgment of the Court is a final determination as between the parties and their privies. Any right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery, or as an answer to a claim set up, cannot be re-tried in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies, though for a different cause of action. The right, question, or fact, once determined, must, as between them, be taken to be conclusively established so long as the judgment remains.

[Emphasis added.]

...

25 The preconditions to the operation of issue estoppel were set out by Dickson J. in *Angle*, supra, at p. 254:

. . . (1) that the same question has been decided; (2) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and, (3) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies ...

26. The appellant's argument is that even though the ESA officer was required to make a decision in a judicial manner, she failed to do so. Although she had jurisdiction under the Employment Standards Act to deal with the claim, the ESA officer lost jurisdiction when she failed to disclose to the appellant the case the appellant had to meet and to give the appellant the opportunity to be heard in answer to the case put against her. The ESA officer therefore never made a "judicial decision" as required. The appellant also says that her own failure to exercise her right to seek internal administrative review of the decision should not be given the conclusive effect adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal. Even if the conditions precedent to issue estoppel were present, she says, the court had a discretion to relieve against the harsh effects of *estoppel per rem judicatem* in the circumstances of this case, and erred in failing to do so.

...

33 The rules governing issue estoppel should not be mechanically applied. The underlying purpose is to balance the public interest in the finality of litigation with the public interest in ensuring that justice is done on the facts of a particular case. (There are corresponding private interests.) The first step is to determine whether the moving party (in this case the respondent) has established the preconditions to the operation of issue estoppel set out by Dickson J. in *Angle*, supra. If successful, the court must

still determine whether, as a matter of discretion, issue estoppel ought to be applied...

34 The appellant was quite entitled, in the first instance, to invoke the jurisdiction of the Ontario superior court to deal with her various monetary claims. The respondent was not entitled as of right to the imposition of an estoppel. It was up to the court to decide whether, in the exercise of its discretion, it would decline to hear aspects of the claims that were previously the subject of ESA administrative proceedings.

...

50 It seems to me that the unsuccessful litigant in administrative proceedings should be encouraged to pursue whatever administrative remedy is available. Here, it is worth repeating, she elected the ESA forum. Employers and employees should be able to rely on ESA determinations unless steps are taken promptly to set them aside. One major legislative objective of the ESA scheme is to facilitate a quick resolution of termination benefits so that both employee and employer can get on to other things. Where, as here, the ESA issues are determined within a year, a contract claim could nevertheless still be commenced thereafter in Ontario within six years of the alleged breach, producing a lingering five years of uncertainty. This is to be discouraged.

51 In summary, it is clear that an administrative decision which is made without jurisdiction from the outset cannot form the basis of an estoppel. The conditions precedent to the adjudicative jurisdiction must be satisfied. Where arguments can be made that an administrative officer or tribunal initially possessed the jurisdiction to make a decision in a judicial manner but erred in the exercise of that jurisdiction, the resulting decision is nevertheless capable of forming the basis of an estoppel. Alleged errors in carrying out the mandate are matters to be considered by the court in the exercise of its discretion. This result makes the principle governing estoppel consistent with the law governing judicial review in *Harelkin*, supra, and collateral attack in *Consolidated Maybrun Mines Ltd.*, supra.

52 Where I differ from the Ontario Court of Appeal in this case is in its conclusion that the failure of the appellant to seek such an administrative review of the ESA officer's flawed decision was fatal to her position. In my view, with respect, the refusal of the ESA officer to afford the appellant proper notice and the opportunity to be heard are matters of great importance in the exercise of the court's discretion, as will be seen.

Binnie J. thereafter reviewed the administrative process that had taken place and held that it would be unjust to consider the process capable of binding the parties; “[w]hatever the appellant's various procedural mistakes in this case, the stubborn fact remains that her claim to commissions worth \$300,000 has simply never been properly considered and adjudicated. On considering the cumulative effect of the foregoing factors it is my view that the Court in its discretion should refuse to apply issue estoppel in this case;” para. 80-81.

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Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79
2003 SCC 63 (S.C.C.)

This case deals with the use of criminal convictions in an administrative law context, with implications for conventional litigation.

A municipal worker was alleged to have committed a sexual assault in the performance of his duties as a recreation instructor. He was convicted. He was fired from his job, grieved the dismissal, and was reinstated by a labour arbitrator who held that he had not committed the act on the reasoning that the conviction was admissible but not conclusive proof and that any evidential presumption was rebutted by the employee.

In the SCC, Arbour J. carefully examined the doctrine of abuse of process as it operates to prevent the relitigation of a criminal conviction and the abuse of process that would arise undermining confidence in the judicial system; it is preferable for the offender to appeal rather than mount a collateral attack through another process which, as here, results in inconsistent findings.

Per Arbour J.:

15 In this case, the reasonableness of the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate the grievor is predicated on the correctness of his assumption that he was not bound by the criminal conviction. That assumption rested on his analysis of complex common law rules and of conflicting jurisprudence. The body of law dealing with the relitigation of issues finally decided in previous judicial proceedings is not only complex; it is also at the heart of the administration of justice. **Properly understood and applied, the doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process govern the interplay between different judicial decision makers. These rules and principles call for a judicial balance between finality, fairness, efficiency and authority of judicial decisions.** The application of these rules, doctrines and principles is clearly outside the sphere of expertise of a labour arbitrator who may be called to have recourse to them. In such a case, he or she must correctly answer the question of law raised. An incorrect approach may be sufficient to lead to a

patently unreasonable outcome. This was reiterated recently by Iacobucci J. in *Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324*, 2003 SCC 42 (CanLII), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157, 2003 SCC 42, at para. 21.

16 Therefore I agree with the Court of Appeal that the arbitrator had to decide correctly whether CUPE was entitled, either at common law or under a statute, to relitigate the issue decided against the grievor in the criminal proceedings.

...

1) Issue Estoppel

23 Issue estoppel is a branch of *res judicata* (the other branch being cause of action estoppel), which precludes the relitigation of issues previously decided in court in another proceeding. **For issue estoppel to be successfully invoked, three preconditions must be met: (1) the issue must be the same as the one decided in the prior decision; (2) the prior judicial decision must have been final; and (3) the parties to both proceedings must be the same, or their privies... The final requirement, known as “mutuality”, has been largely abandoned in the United States and has been the subject of much academic and judicial debate there as well as in the United Kingdom and, to some extent, in this country...**

...

29 ... What emerges from the American experience with the abandonment of mutuality is a twofold concern: **(1) the application of the estoppel must be sufficiently principled and predictable to promote efficiency; and (2) it must contain sufficient flexibility to prevent unfairness. In my view, this is what the doctrine of abuse of process offers, particularly, as here, where the issue involves a conviction in a criminal court for a serious crime. In a case such as this one, the true concerns are not primarily related to mutuality. The true concerns, well reflected in the reasons of the Court of Appeal, are with the integrity and the coherence of the administration of justice. This will often be the case when the estoppel originates from a finding made in a criminal case where many of the traditional concerns related to mutuality lose their significance.**

...

32 As the present case illustrates, the primary concerns here are about the integrity of the criminal process and the increased authority of a criminal verdict, rather than some of the more traditional issue estoppel concerns

that focus on the interests of the parties, such as costs and multiple “vexation”. For these reasons, I see no need to reverse or relax the long-standing application of the mutuality requirement in this case and I would conclude that issue estoppel has no application. I now turn to the question of whether the decision of the arbitrator amounted to a collateral attack on the verdict of the criminal court.

...

(3) Abuse of Process

35 Judges have an inherent and residual discretion to prevent an abuse of the court’s process. This concept of abuse of process was described at common law as proceedings “unfair to the point that they are contrary to the interest of justice”... and as “oppressive treatment”... McLachlin J. (as she then was) expressed it this way in *R. v. Scott*, 1990 CanLII 27 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 979, at p. 1007:

. . . abuse of process may be established where: (1) the proceedings are oppressive or vexatious; and, (2) violate the fundamental principles of justice underlying the community’s sense of fair play and decency. The concepts of oppressiveness and vexatiousness underline the interest of the accused in a fair trial. But the doctrine evokes as well the public interest in a fair and just trial process and the proper administration of justice. The unfair or oppressive treatment of an accused may disentitle the Crown to carry on with the prosecution of a charge... When the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies, the common law doctrine of abuse of process

The doctrine of abuse of process is used in a variety of legal contexts. is subsumed into the principles of the Charter such that there is often overlap between abuse of process and constitutional remedies... The doctrine nonetheless continues to have application as a non-Charter remedy...

37 In the context that interests us here, the doctrine of abuse of process engages “the inherent power of the court to prevent the misuse of its procedure, in a way that would . . . bring the administration of justice into disrepute”... Canadian courts have applied the doctrine of abuse of process to preclude relitigation in circumstances where the strict requirements of issue estoppel (typically the privity / mutuality requirements) are not met, but where allowing the litigation to proceed would nonetheless violate such principles as judicial economy, consistency, finality and the integrity of the administration of justice... This has resulted in some criticism, on the ground that the doctrine of abuse of process by relitigation is in effect non-mutual issue estoppel by another name without the

important qualifications recognized by the American courts as part and parcel of the general doctrine of non- mutual issue estoppel...

...

43 Critics of that approach have argued that when abuse of process is used as a proxy for issue estoppel, it obscures the true question while adding nothing but a vague sense of discretion. I disagree. At least in the context before us, namely, an attempt to relitigate a criminal conviction, I believe that abuse of process is a doctrine much more responsive to the real concerns at play. In all of its applications, the primary focus of the doctrine of abuse of process is the integrity of the adjudicative functions of courts. Whether it serves to disentitle the Crown from proceeding because of undue delay... or whether it prevents a civil party from using the courts for an improper purpose... the focus is less on the interest of parties and more on the integrity of judicial decision making as a branch of the administration of justice. In a case such as the present one, it is that concern that compels a bar against relitigation, more than any sense of unfairness to a party being called twice to put its case forward, for example. When that is understood, the parameters of the doctrine become easier to define, and the exercise of discretion is better anchored in principle.

...

45 When asked to decide whether a criminal conviction, prima facie admissible in a proceeding under s. 22.1 of the Ontario Evidence Act, ought to be rebutted or taken as conclusive, courts will turn to the doctrine of abuse of process to ascertain whether relitigation would be detrimental to the adjudicative process as defined above. When the focus is thus properly on the integrity of the adjudicative process, the motive of the party who seeks to relitigate, or whether he or she wishes to do so as a defendant rather than as a plaintiff, cannot be decisive factors in the application of the bar against relitigation.

46 Thus, in the case at bar, it matters little whether Oliver's motive for relitigation was primarily to secure re-employment, rather than to challenge his criminal conviction in an attempt to undermine its validity... A desire to attack a judicial finding is not in itself an improper purpose. The law permits that objective to be pursued through various reviewing mechanisms such as appeals or judicial review. Indeed reviewability is an important aspect of finality. A decision is final and binding on the parties only when all available reviews have been exhausted or abandoned. What is improper is to attempt to impeach a judicial finding by the impermissible route of relitigation in a different forum. Therefore, motive is of little or no import.

47 There is also no reason to constrain the doctrine of abuse of process only to those cases where the plaintiff has initiated the relitigation. The designation of the parties to the second litigation may mask the reality of

the situation. In the present case, for instance, aside from the technical mechanism of the grievance procedures, who should be viewed as the initiator of the employment litigation between the grievor, Oliver, and his union on the one hand, and the City of Toronto on the other? Technically, the union is the “plaintiff” in the arbitration procedure. But the City of Toronto used Oliver’s criminal conviction as a basis for his dismissal. I cannot see what difference it makes, again from the point of view of the integrity of the adjudicative process, whether Oliver is labelled a plaintiff or a defendant when it comes to relitigating his criminal conviction.

...

51 Rather than focus on the motive or status of the parties, the doctrine of abuse of process concentrates on the integrity of the adjudicative process. Three preliminary observations are useful in that respect. First, there can be no assumption that relitigation will yield a more accurate result than the original proceeding. Second, if the same result is reached in the subsequent proceeding, the relitigation will prove to have been a waste of judicial resources as well as an unnecessary expense for the parties and possibly an additional hardship for some witnesses. Finally, if the result in the subsequent proceeding is different from the conclusion reached in the first on the very same issue, the inconsistency, in and of itself, will undermine the credibility of the entire judicial process, thereby diminishing its authority, its credibility and its aim of finality.

52 In contrast, proper review by way of appeal increases confidence in the ultimate result and affirms both the authority of the process as well as the finality of the result. It is therefore apparent that from the system’s point of view, relitigation carries serious detrimental effects and should be avoided unless the circumstances dictate that relitigation is in fact necessary to enhance the credibility and the effectiveness of the adjudicative process as a whole. There may be instances where relitigation will enhance, rather than impeach, the integrity of the judicial system, for example: (1) when the first proceeding is tainted by fraud or dishonesty; (2) when fresh, new evidence, previously unavailable, conclusively impeaches the original results; or (3) when fairness dictates that the original result should not be binding in the new context. This was stated unequivocally by this Court in *Danyluk*, supra, at para. 80.

53 The discretionary factors that apply to prevent the doctrine of issue estoppel from operating in an unjust or unfair way are equally available to prevent the doctrine of abuse of process from achieving a similar undesirable result. There are many circumstances in which the bar against relitigation, either through the doctrine of *res judicata* or that of abuse of process, would create unfairness. If, for instance, the stakes in the original proceeding were too minor to generate a full and robust response, while the

subsequent stakes were considerable, fairness would dictate that the administration of justice would be better served by permitting the second proceeding to go forward than by insisting that finality should prevail. An inadequate incentive to defend, the discovery of new evidence in appropriate circumstances, or a tainted original process may all overcome the interest in maintaining the finality of the original decision (Danyluk, *supra*, at para. 51; Franco, *supra*, at para. 55).

54 These considerations are particularly apposite when the attempt is to relitigate a criminal conviction. Casting doubt over the validity of a criminal conviction is a very serious matter. Inevitably in a case such as this one, the conclusion of the arbitrator has precisely that effect, whether this was intended or not. The administration of justice must equip itself with all legitimate means to prevent wrongful convictions and to address any real possibility of such an occurrence after the fact. Collateral attacks and relitigation, however, are not in my view appropriate methods of redress since they inordinately tax the adjudicative process while doing nothing to ensure a more trustworthy result.

55 In light of the above, it is apparent that the common law doctrines of issue estoppel, collateral attack and abuse of process adequately capture the concerns that arise when finality in litigation must be balanced against fairness to a particular litigant. There is therefore no need to endorse, as the Court of Appeal did, a self-standing and independent “finality principle” either as a separate doctrine or as an independent test to preclude relitigation.

...

56 I am of the view that the facts in this appeal point to the blatant abuse of process that results when relitigation of this sort is permitted. The grievor was convicted in a criminal court and he exhausted all his avenues of appeal. In law, his conviction must stand, with all its consequent legal effects...

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The plaintiffs brought disciplinary complaints and an action against police officers for assault bound up with an unlawful arrest. The complaints under the *Police Act* were dismissed – issue estoppel in respect of the civil action? No (4:3).

Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. (majority):

28 **Relitigation of an issue wastes resources, makes it risky for parties to rely on the results of their prior litigation, unfairly exposes parties to additional costs, raises the spectre of inconsistent adjudicative determinations and, where the initial decision maker is in the administrative law field, may undermine the legislature's intent in setting up the administrative scheme. For these reasons, the law has adopted a number of doctrines to limit relitigation.**

29 **The one relevant on this appeal is the doctrine of issue estoppel. It balances judicial finality and economy and other considerations of fairness to the parties.** It holds that a party may not relitigate an issue that was finally decided in prior judicial proceedings between the same parties or those who stand in their place. However, even if these elements are present, the court retains discretion to not apply issue estoppel when its application would work an injustice.

30 The principle underpinning this discretion is that "[a] judicial doctrine developed to serve the ends of justice should not be applied mechanically to work an injustice": *Danyluk*, at para. 1; see also *Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79*, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77 (S.C.C.), at paras. 52-53.

31 Issue estoppel, with its residual discretion, applies to administrative tribunal decisions. The legal framework governing the exercise of this discretion is set out in *Danyluk*. In our view, this framework has not been overtaken by this Court's subsequent jurisprudence. The discretion requires the courts to take into account the range and diversity of structures, mandates and procedures of administrative decision makers however, the discretion must not be exercised so as to, in effect, sanction collateral attack, or to undermine the integrity of the administrative scheme. As highlighted in this Court's jurisprudence, particularly since *New Brunswick (Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir*, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.), legislation establishing administrative tribunals reflects the policy choices of the legislators and administrative decision making must be treated with respect by the courts. However, as this Court said in *Danyluk*, at para. 67: "The objective is to ensure that the operation of issue estoppel promotes the orderly administration of justice but not at the cost of real injustice in the particular case."

B. No Public Policy Rule Precluding Issue Estoppel with Respect to Police Disciplinary Hearings

32 The Ontario Court of Appeal applied a conventional analysis of issue estoppel, analyzing the various factors identified in *Danyluk*. Mr. Penner and a number of interveners ask this Court, as a matter of public policy, to prohibit the application of issue estoppel to findings made in a police disciplinary hearing if it prevents a complainant from accessing the courts for damages on the same claims. They submit that the application of issue estoppel to police disciplinary hearings usurps the role of the courts as guardians of the Constitution and the rule of law, and that public policy requires that police accountability be subject to judicial oversight. These submissions were raised overtly for the first time before this Court.

33 Police oversight is a complex issue that attracts intense public attention and differing public policy responses. Over time, legislative frameworks have been revised with the stated goals of promoting efficient police services and increasing the transparency and accountability of the public complaints process. In a 2006 case, the Ontario Divisional Court concluded that the legislature allowed for "institutional bias" in the manner of appointing a hearing officer under s. 76(1) of the PSA: *Sharma v. Waterloo Regional Police Service* (2006), 213 O.A.C. 371 (Ont. Div. Ct.), at para. 27. The parties in this case do not contest that this is a legitimate exercise of the legislature's authority, and the Divisional Court in *Sharma*, at para. 28, concluded that the ability to appoint "retired police officers not associated with this force is capable of founding such independence as necessary". See also the Honourable Patrick J. Lesage, Report on the Police Complaints System in Ontario (2005), at pp. 77-78.

34 The public complaints process incorporates a number of features to enhance public participation and accountability. For instance, pursuant to Part II of the PSA, the Commission, as an agency comprised of civilian members, provides independent oversight of police services in Ontario to ensure fairness and accountability to the public. Part V sets out a comprehensive public complaints process by which members of the public can file official complaints against policies or services. Judicial oversight of disciplinary hearings under the PSA is available by statutory right of appeal to the Commission and then to the Divisional Court: see ss. 70(1) and 71(1).

35 We are not persuaded that it is either necessary or desirable to create a rule of public policy excluding police disciplinary hearings from the application of issue estoppel. The doctrine of issue estoppel allows for the exercise of discretion to ensure that no injustice results; it calls for a case-by-case review of the circumstances to determine whether its application would be unfair or unjust.

C. Discretionary Application of Issue Estoppel

(1) Approach to the Exercise of Discretion

36 We agree with the decisions of the courts below that all three preconditions for issue estoppel are established in this case. Thus, this case turns upon the Court of Appeal's exercise of discretion in determining whether it would be unjust to apply the doctrine of issue estoppel in this case.

37 This Court in *Danyluk*, at paras. 68-80, recognized several factors identified by Laskin J.A. in *Minott v. O'Shanter Development Co.* (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.), that are relevant to the discretionary analysis in the context of a prior administrative tribunal proceeding.

38 The list of factors in *Danyluk* merely indicates some circumstances that may be relevant in a particular case to determine whether, on the whole, it is fair to apply issue estoppel. The list is not exhaustive. It is neither a checklist nor an invitation to engage in a mechanical analysis.

39 Broadly speaking, the factors identified in the jurisprudence illustrate that unfairness may arise in two main ways which overlap and are not mutually exclusive. First, the unfairness of applying issue estoppel may arise from the unfairness of the prior proceedings. Second, even where the prior proceedings were conducted fairly and properly having regard to their purposes, it may nonetheless be unfair to use the results of that process to preclude the subsequent claim.

(a) Fairness of the Prior Proceedings

40 If the prior proceedings were unfair to a party, it will likely compound the unfairness to hold that party to its results for the purposes of a subsequent proceeding. For example, in *Danyluk*, the prior administrative decision resulted from a process in which Ms. Danyluk had not received notice of the other party's allegations or been given a chance to respond to them.

41 Many of the factors identified in the jurisprudence, including the procedural safeguards, the availability of an appeal, and the expertise of the decision maker, speak to the opportunity to participate in and the fairness of the administrative proceeding. These considerations are important because they address the question of whether there was a fair opportunity for the parties to put forward their position, a fair opportunity to adjudicate the issues in the prior proceedings and a means to have the decision reviewed. If there

was not, it may well be unfair to hold the parties to the results of that adjudication for the purposes of different proceedings.

(b) The Fairness of Using the Results of the Prior Proceedings to Bar Subsequent Proceedings

42 The second way in which the operation of issue estoppel may be unfair is not so much concerned with the fairness of the prior proceedings but with the fairness of using their results to preclude the subsequent proceedings. Fairness, in this second sense, is a much more nuanced enquiry. On the one hand, a party is expected to raise all appropriate issues and is not permitted multiple opportunities to obtain a favourable judicial determination. Finality is important both to the parties and to the judicial system. However, even if the prior proceeding was conducted fairly and properly having regard to its purpose, injustice may arise from using the results to preclude the subsequent proceedings. This may occur, for example, where there is a significant difference between the purposes, processes or stakes involved in the two proceedings. We recognize that there will always be differences in purpose, process and stakes between administrative and court proceedings. In order to establish unfairness in the second sense we have described, such differences must be significant and assessed in light of this Court's recognition that finality is an objective that is also important in the administrative law context. As Doherty and Feldman J.J.A. wrote in *Schweneke v. Ontario* (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 97 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 39, if courts routinely declined to apply issue estoppel because the procedural protections in the administrative proceedings do not match those available in the courts, issue estoppel would become the exception rather than the rule.

43 Two factors discussed in *Danyluk* — the "wording of the statute from which the power to issue the administrative order derives" (paras. 68-70) and "the purpose of the legislation" (paras. 71-73), including the degree of financial stakes involved — are highly relevant here to the fairness analysis in this second sense. They take into account the intention of the legislature in creating the administrative proceedings and they shape the reasonable expectations of the parties about the scope and effect of the proceedings and their impact on the parties' broader legal rights: *Minott*, at pp. 341-42.

44 For example, in *British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Bugbusters Pest Management Inc.* (1998), 50 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1 (B.C. C.A.), a defendant in a civil action relied on the decision of a Deputy Chief Forester to preclude the Crown's civil action for damages caused by a forest fire. The Court of Appeal upheld the chambers judge's decision to exercise discretion against applying issue estoppel. As the statute did not contemplate that the Deputy Chief Forester's decision about the cause of a fire would be a final resolution of that issue, it followed that it "was not within the reasonable

expectation of either party at the time of those proceedings" that it would be: *Bugbusters*, at para. 30.

45 Thus, where the purposes of the two proceedings diverge significantly, applying issue estoppel may be unfair even though the prior proceeding was conducted with scrupulous fairness, having regard to the purposes of the legislative scheme that governs the prior proceeding. For example, where little is at stake for a litigant in the prior proceeding, there may be little incentive to participate in it with full vigour: *Toronto (City)*, at para. 53.

46 There is also a general policy concern linked to the purpose of the legislative scheme which governs the prior proceeding. To apply issue estoppel based on a proceeding in which a party reasonably expected that little was at stake risks inducing future litigants to either avoid the proceeding altogether or to participate more actively and vigorously than would otherwise make sense. This could undermine the expeditiousness and efficiency of administrative regimes and therefore undermine the purpose of creating the tribunal: *Burchill v. Yukon Territory (Commissioner)*, 2002 YKCA 4, [2002] Y.J. No. 19 (Y.T. C.A.), at para. 28; *Minott*, at p. 341; and *Danyluk*, at para. 73. In the context of this appeal, it might discourage citizens from filing complaints about police misconduct.

47 Thus, the text and purpose of the legislative scheme shape the parties' reasonable expectations in relation to the scope and effect of the administrative proceedings. They guide how and to what extent the parties participate in the process. Where the legislative scheme contemplates multiple proceedings and the purposes of those proceedings are widely divergent, the application of the doctrine in such circumstances might not only upset the parties' legitimate and reasonable expectations but may also undermine the efficacy and policy goals of the administrative proceedings by either encouraging more formality and protraction or even discouraging access to the administrative proceedings altogether.

48 These considerations are also relevant to weighing another factor identified in *Danyluk*: the procedural safeguards available to the parties in the prior administrative process. The consideration of a party's decision whether to take advantage of procedural protections available in the prior proceeding cannot be divorced from the consideration of the party's reasonable expectations about what is at stake in those proceedings or the fundamentally different purposes of the two proceedings. The connections between the relevant considerations must be viewed as a whole.

(2) Fairness of Using the Disciplinary Finding to Preclude a Civil Action in this Case

49 In our respectful view, the Court of Appeal failed to focus on fairness in the second sense we have just described. We do not quarrel with the finding of the Court of Appeal that the disciplinary hearing was itself fair and that Mr. Penner participated in a meaningful way. However, while the court thoroughly assessed the fairness of the disciplinary proceeding itself, it failed to fully analyze the fairness of using the results of that process to preclude the appellant's civil claims, having regard to the nature and scope of those earlier proceedings and the parties' reasonable expectations in relation to them.

(a) The Legislation Establishing the Disciplinary Hearing

50 As the Court of Appeal pointed out, "the legislature did not intend to foreclose [Mr. Penner's] civil action simply because he filed a complaint under the [PSA]" (para. 42). The PSA features statutory privilege provisions, three of which are noteworthy here. Documents

generated during the complaint process are inadmissible in civil proceedings: s. 69(9). Persons who carry out duties in the complaint process cannot be forced to testify in civil proceedings about information obtained in the course of their duties: s. 69(8). Finally, persons engaged in the administration of the complaints process are obligated to keep information obtained during the process confidential, subject to certain exceptions: s. 80. These provisions specifically contemplate parallel proceedings in relation to the same subject matter.

51 Here, as recognized by the Court of Appeal, the legislation does not intend to foreclose parallel proceedings when a member of the public files a complaint. This would shape the reasonable expectations of the parties and the nature and extent of their participation in the process.

52 Nothing in the legislative text, therefore, could give rise to a reasonable expectation that the disciplinary hearing would be conclusive of Mr. Penner's legal rights against the Constables, the Chief of Police or the Police Services Board in his civil action.

(b) Reasonable Expectations of the Parties: Different Purposes of the Proceedings and Other Considerations

53 The Court of Appeal recognized that the purposes of a police disciplinary proceeding and a civil action were different and that this weighed against the application of issue estoppel.

54 The police disciplinary hearing is part of the process through which the officers' employer decides whether to impose employment-related discipline on them. By making the complainant a party, the PSA promotes transparency and public accountability. However, this process provides no remedy or costs for the complainant. A civil action, on the other hand, provides a forum in which a party that has suffered a wrong may obtain compensation for that wrong.

55 In addition to the legislative text, several other facts point to the same conclusion about the parties' reasonable expectations about the impact of the disciplinary hearing on the civil action.

56 First, Mr. Penner's civil action was filed in July 2003; almost a year before the hearing officer released his decision on June 28, 2004. In *Danyluk*, the civil proceedings had commenced before the administrative proceedings concluded. Binnie J. reasoned that this weighed against applying issue estoppel because "the respondents were well aware, in law and in fact, that they were expected to respond to parallel and to some extent overlapping proceedings" (para. 70).

57 Second, Hermiston J., in the most pertinent Ontario case on the question of issue estoppel in the police disciplinary hearing context at the time, *Porter v. York Regional Police*, [2001] O.J. No. 5970 (Ont. S.C.J.), stated that an acquittal of an officer at a disciplinary hearing did not give rise to issue estoppel in relation to the same issues in a subsequent civil action.

58 Third, a person in Mr. Penner's position might well think it unlikely that a proceeding in which he or she had no personal or financial stake could preclude a claim for significant damages in his or her civil action.

(c) Financial Stake in the Disciplinary Hearing

59 The Court of Appeal noted that the lack of a financial stake in the administrative proceeding, on its own, does not ordinarily resolve how the court should exercise its discretion in applying issue estoppel in a civil action. However, the Court of Appeal went further. With respect to the absence of a financial stake in the outcome of the disciplinary hearing, the court said, at para. 43:

This is an important consideration weighing against applying issue estoppel, but its strength is diminished by the potential indirect benefit to Mr. Penner from the disciplinary proceedings. If, for example, the hearing officer had

found that the two police officers did not have reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Penner or used excessive force on him, those findings would likely have estopped the officers from asserting otherwise in Mr. Penner's civil action. In other words, issue estoppel works both ways.

60 In our view, this analysis is flawed. It cannot necessarily be said that issue estoppel "works both ways" here. As the Court of Appeal recognized, because the PSA requires that misconduct by a police officer be "proved on clear and convincing evidence" (s. 64(10)), it follows that such a conclusion might, depending upon the nature of the factual findings, properly preclude relitigation of the issue of liability in a civil action where the balance of probabilities — a lower standard of proof — would apply. However, this cannot be said in the case of an acquittal. The prosecutor's failure to prove the charges by "clear and convincing evidence" does not necessarily mean that those same allegations could not be established on a balance of probabilities. Given the different standards of proof, there would have been no reason for a complainant to expect that issue estoppel would apply if the officers

were acquitted. Indeed, in *Porter*, at para. 11, the court refused to apply issue estoppel following an acquittal in a police disciplinary hearing because the hearing officer's decision "was determined by a high standard of proof and might have been different if it had been decided based on the lower civil standard". Thus, the parties could not reasonably have contemplated that the acquittal of the officers at the disciplinary hearing would be determinative of the outcome of Mr. Penner's civil action.

61 By assuming that issue estoppel "works both ways", the Court of Appeal attached too little weight to the fact that Mr. Penner had no financial stake in the disciplinary hearing and wrongly concluded that he had more at stake than he could reasonably have thought at the time.

(d) Issue Estoppel May Work to Undermine the Purpose of Administrative Proceedings

62 Another important policy consideration referred to earlier arises in this case: the risk of adding to the complexity and length of administrative proceedings by attaching undue weight to their results through applying issue estoppel. It is true that Mr. Penner could have participated even more fully in the proceedings by hiring counsel in an attempt to obtain a finding of misconduct so as to assist his civil action. But accepting this line of argument too readily may lead to unintended and undesirable results. It risks turning the administrative process into a proxy for Mr. Penner's civil action. If it is before the hearing officer, and not the court, that an action for damages is to be won or lost, litigants in Mr. Penner's position will have every incentive to mount a full-scale case, which would tend to defeat the expeditious operation

of the disciplinary hearing.

63 In the context of this appeal, it would also mean that the officers, who have much at stake in the hearing, would effectively be forced to face two prosecutors rather than one, given the presence of counsel for the complainant. We doubt that this would enhance either the efficacy of or the fairness to the officers in the disciplinary hearing. Finally, a further significant risk is that potential complainants will simply not come forward with public complaints in order to avoid prejudicing their civil actions.

(e) The Role of the Chief of Police

64 Under the public complaints process of the PSA at the relevant time, the Chief of Police investigated and determined whether a hearing was required following the submission of a public complaint. The Chief of Police appointed the investigator, the prosecutor and the hearing officer.

65 It has been recognized that these arrangements are not objectionable for the purposes of a disciplinary hearing (as in Sharma). However, in our view, the fact that this decision was made by the designate of the Chief of Police should be taken into account is assessing the fairness of using the results of the disciplinary process to preclude Mr. Penner's civil claims. While this point was not clearly placed before the Court of Appeal, we think it is an important one.

66 Applying issue estoppel against the complainant here had the effect of permitting the Chief of Police to become the judge of his own case, with the result that his designate's decision had the effect of exonerating the Chief and his police service from civil liability. In our view, applying issue estoppel here is a serious affront to basic principles of fairness.

67 We emphasize that this unfairness does not reside in the Chief of Police carrying out his statutory duties. The parties accept that, given the statutory framework, there is no objection on fairness grounds to the role of the Chief and there is certainly no suggestion that he failed in any way to carry out his statutory duties. Further, no obvious unfairness arises if the disciplinary decision finds police misconduct, as this is a decision against the interests of the Chief or the Police Services Board. The unfairness that concerns us only arises at the point that the Chief's (or his designate's) decision that there was no police misconduct in a disciplinary context is used for the quite different purpose of exonerating him, by means of issue estoppel, from civil liability relating to the same matter.

68 Had the Court of Appeal been given the opportunity to fully consider the importance of these points, our view is that it would have seen that applying issue estoppel against the appellant in the circumstances of

this case was fundamentally unfair.

VI. Conclusion

69 Issue estoppel is about balancing judicial economy and finality and other considerations of fairness to the parties. It is a flexible doctrine that permits the court to respond to the equities of a particular case. We see no reason to depart from that approach and create a rule of public policy to preclude the application of issue estoppel in the context of public complaints against the police.

70 Given the legislative scheme and the widely divergent purposes and financial stakes in the two proceedings, the parties could not reasonably have contemplated that the acquittal of the officers at the disciplinary hearing would determine the outcome of Mr. Penner's civil action. These are important considerations and the Court of Appeal did not take them into account in assessing the weight of other factors, such as Mr. Penner's status as a party and the procedural protections afforded by the administrative process. Further, the application of issue estoppel had the effect of using the decision of the Chief of Police's designate to exonerate the Chief in the civil claim.

71 Applying issue estoppel against Mr. Penner to preclude his civil claim for damages in the circumstances of this case was fundamentally unfair.